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(I)
Introduction
The
Royal Government of Cambodia (RGC) embarked on a three-year plan to
demobilize a total of 31,500 soldiers from the Royal Cambodian Armed
Forces (RCAF). The Council for Demobilization of Armed Forces (CDAF), the
governmental body responsible for demobilization in Cambodia, began
implementation with a pilot demobilization project in the provinces of
Kampot, Kampong Thom, Banteay Meanchey and Battambang, In the pilot
project, 1,500 ex-combatant soldiers were demobilized between May and July
2000.
During
October 2001, the RGC and the CDAF Secretariat expanded their efforts and
began full-scale demobilization of armed forces throughout the country.
From 15 October to 26 December, 2001, 15,000 ex-combatant soldiers were
demobilized in ten provinces: Kampong Chhnang, Kampong Speu, Kampot,
Kampong Cham, Kandal, Battambang, Banteay Meanchey, Siem Reap, Kampong
Thom and Steung Treng.
Upon
invitation from the CDAF Secretariat, eight NGOs observed the general
process of demobilization, conducted interviews with demobilized soldiers,
and provided awareness-raising presentations on issues related to small
arms and light weapons.
Of
the demobilized soldiers interviewed, 75% were happy to be demobilized
from their military services and return to civilian life. They did not
want to be soldiers any longer. Rather, they want to live with and support
their families. 90%
of
demobilized soldiers supported demobilization since internal armed
conflict has come to an end.
(ii)
Identified Key Issues
Demobilization
without Disarmament
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No collection of issued weapons took place before demobilization.
Failure to collect and destroy weapons may cause communities to fear that
ex-soldiers will pose a threat to their security.
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It is questionable whether most soldiers had already turned in
their issued and private weapons. On one hand the majority (97%) claimed
that all weapons had already been turned in, although this cannot be
verified. However, 67% of those interviewed believed that other soldiers
still hid or kept weapons.
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60% of demobilized soldiers interviewed indicated that they did not
clearly understand current weapons legislation, the legal consequences of
illegal weapons use and possession, or the role of civilians in weapons
reduction. This group claimed that they lacked basic skills in solving
problems peacefully.
Limited
Role of NGO Monitoring
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The CDAF Secretariat should be commended for inviting NGO
representatives to participate in the monitoring of demobilization
efforts. The cooperation between government and civil society in
demobilization is important, indicating an improvement in civic -military
relations in Cambodia.
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The role of NGOs, however, was limited to the demobilization
discharge center. NGOs were unable to observe the full demobilization and
reinsertion process, before and after the stage in the discharge centers,
thus limiting transparency and full public trust
Concerns
about Reintegration
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The
majority of demobilized soldiers interviewed (70%) are worried about their
future living conditions. 65% were worried about their health when they
return to live in their respective communities.
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24% of
demobilized soldiers interviewed were worried about their security after
becoming civilians. They claim that not all illegal weapons were collected
or confiscated from “bad persons”, criminals, or others in their
communities. They expected greater fear of theft after collecting their
support packages. Some soldiers said that if personal weapons possession
were permitted, they would still need and want guns to protect their family
and property. They did not have confidence in the ability of local
authorities or security forces to provide adequate security and safety
when they return to their communities-
(iii)
Recommendations for the RGC and the International Donor Community
Disarmament
(in this case, the collection of weapons from ex-combatant soldiers)
should be integrated into the demobilization process.
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Demobilized
soldiers should be given an opportunity to publicly hand in their issued
and non-issued weapons before demobilization. By doing so, it would show
the public that soldiers surrendered weapons before demobilization. When
interviewed, most demobilized soldiers supported weapons collection before
demobilization.
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Destroy one
weapon for each soldier demobilized. Weapons collection and destruction,
either from demobilized soldiers and/or government stockpiles, is an
important symbol. It can help civilians trust that disarmament and
demobilization will directly result in improved security for their
communities.
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Continue
raising the awareness of demobilized soldiers on small arms issues and
peace building.
Continue
and expand the presence of NGOs in monitoring demobilization and
reinsertion.
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CDAF
should provide NGOs with opportunities to monitor the first stage of
demobilization: interviewing and selecting soldiers for demobilization.
Doing so would promote greater transparency in the process of
demobilization, thus ensuring proper implementation of future
demobilization efforts.
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NGOs should be
allowed to monitor the donation process of support packages to former
demobilized soldiers. Involvement of NGOs in monitoring of donations can
help to ensure that each demobilized soldier receives their chosen
package, and that the quality of packages is as promised.
More
efforts towards the reintegration of demobilized soldiers are needed.
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Reintegration
efforts should include vocational training for the long-term benefit of
demobilized soldiers. Poverty reduction programs could focus on the communities
of demobilized soldiers. Support and assistance should especially be
provided when they first return to their communities to ensure stable
resettlement.
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Reintegration effort should include activities that seek to limit
discrimination against demobilized soldiers and promote peaceful conflict
resolution in their local communities. NGOs should be encouraged and
supported to actively and creatively find ways to address this fear of
demobilized soldiers. Also, activities should be undertaken with local
communities to address their fears and find ways to promote peacebuilding
and peaceful conflict resolution.
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