Harmonising the Provision of Technical Assistance:

Finding the Right Balance and Avoiding the New Religion

Heather Baser

Peter Morgan

The **European Centre for Development Policy Management** (ECDPM) aims to improve international cooperation between Europe and countries in Africa, the Caribbean, and the Pacific.

Created in 1986 as an independent foundation, the Centre's objectives are:

- to enhance the capacity of public and private actors in ACP and other low-income countries; and
- to improve cooperation between development partners in Europe and the ACP Region.

The Centre focuses on four interconnected themes:

- Actors of Partnerships
- ACP-EU Trade Relations
- Political Dimensions of Partnerships
- Internal Donor Reform

The Centre collaborates with other organisations and has a network of contributors in the European and the ACP countries. Knowledge, insight and experience gained from process facilitation, dialogue, networking, infield research and consultations are widely shared with targeted ACP and EU audiences through international conferences, focussed briefing sessions, electronic media and key publications.

ECDPM Discussion Papers

The ECDPM Discussion Papers report on work in progress at the European Centre for Development Policy Management. They are circulated among practitioners, researchers and policy-makers who are invited to contribute to and comment on the Discussion Papers. Comments, suggestions, and requests for further copies should be sent to the address below. Opinions expressed in this paper do not necessarily represent the views of ECDPM or its partners.

For further information

Jacquie Croucher, ECDPM, Onze-Lieve-Vrouweplein 21
NL-6211 HE Maastricht, The Netherlands
Tel.: (31)-(0)43-350 29 00, Fax: (31)-(0)43-350 29 02
E-Mail: info@ecdpm.org, http://www.ecdpm.org

Harmonising the Provision of Technical Assistance:

Finding the Right Balance and Avoiding the New Religion

Heather Baser
Peter Morgan

A Study for the Directorate-General for Development Cooperation (DGIS)
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands

June 2002

Contents

Acronyms and Abbreviations

AFD	Agence Française de Développement (France)
BMZ	Bundesministerium für Wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung (Germany)
CDF	Comprehensive Development Framework
CFAA	Country Financial Accountability Assessment (World Bank)
CGIAR	Consultative Group for International Agricultural Research
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
CRSP	Civil Service Reform Programme (Ethiopia)
DAC	Development Assistance Committee (OECD)
DFID	Department for International Development (UK)
DGIS	Directorate-General for Development Cooperation (the Netherlands)
DPSM	Directorate of Public Service Management (Botswana)
EC	European Commission
ECDPM	European Centre for Development Policy Management
EFAG	Education Funding Agencies Group (Uganda)
ESIP	Education Sector Investment Programme (Uganda)
ESDP	Education Sector Development Programme (Ethiopia)
EU	European Union
FINNIDA	Finnish International Development Agency
GNP	gross national product
GTZ	Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (Germany)
HIPC	Highly Indebted Poor Countries
IDO	international development organisation
IDRC	International Development Research Centre (Canada)
JICA	Japanese International Cooperation Agency
KFW	Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (Germany)
M&E	Monitoring and evaluation
MEDAC	Ministry of Economic Development and Cooperation (Ethiopia)
MOF	Ministry of Finance (Ethiopia)
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
MFDP	Ministry of Finance and Development Planning (Botswana)
MPF	Ministry of Planning and Finance (Mozambique)
NGO	non-governmental organisation
NORAD	Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
PAP	Programme Action Plan (Ethiopia)
PATA	Pooling Agreement for Technical Assistance (health sector, Mozambique)
PER	public expenditure review
PIM	Programme Implementation Manual (Ethiopia)
PRBS	poverty reduction budget support
PROAGRI	Agricultural Sector Programme (Mozambique)
Prodess	Heath and Social Sector Development Program (Mali)
PRSP	poverty reduction strategy paper
SDC	Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation
Sida	Swedish International Development Agency
SIP	sector investment programme
SSTAF	Social Sector Technical Assistance Fund (Ethiopia)
SWAp	sector-wide approach
TA	technical assistance
TAS	Tanzania Assistance Strategy
ToR	terms of reference

TPAR	Tax Policy and Administrative Reform (Ethiopia)
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNFPA	United Nations Fund for Population Activities
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WHO	World Health Organisation

1   Introduction

In April 2001, the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs asked the European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM) to undertake a study on the harmonisation of technical assistance (TA) in the context of sector-wide approaches. This study is part of the ongoing reflection within international development organisations (IDOs) on ways to harmonise their management procedures. The overall aims of such initiatives are to encourage country ownership, to reduce the fragmentation of externally funded development activities, and to reduce the administrative burden on all development partners.

Based on reviews at field level and discussions with IDOs, this study aims to encourage current attempts to bring policy thinking on improved aid management practices to the operational level. The main form of harmonisation considered is pooling, which the terms of reference for this study defined as 'the integration of all technical assistance within a single management and financing framework under recipient country ownership or third party management support', and requiring 'acceptance and usage, by all stakeholders, of common implementation procedures'. This definition was refined during the course of the study, as will be discussed in this report.

The study addresses a number of key questions:
- To what extent is pooling a useful tool for harmonising donor procedures? When and where is it most effective?
- Does technical assistance[1] (TA) pooling provide a mechanism for enhancing national ownership?
- What are the capacity and procedural constraints faced by both developing countries and IDOs in using pooling more extensively?
- To what extent is harmonisation and pooling of TA contributing to changes in aid management practices, in particular the relationship between governments and the IDOs and the practices of the international community?

In answering these questions, the study has reviewed the changing context of international development policy and activities. In particular, it focuses on issues related to the pooling of TA, particularly the role of national ownership, the management capacity required of both developing countries and IDOs, and the procedural constraints. The conclusions call into question some conventional wisdom.

The full report of this study, entitled *The Pooling of Technical Assistance: An Overview based on Field Experience in Six African Countries*,[2] was published in November 2001. The present paper is a short version of the report reworked for a field-level audience with the specific purpose of providing background material for consultations with African policy makers and practitioners. Following this introduction, the report describes the background, the current status and contribution of TA pooling in six countries, and the factors shaping TA pooling. It then presents some suggested improvements in support of TA pooling, with an emphasis on operational issues, a framework for analysis for when pooling is likely to be an effective instrument and, finally, some brief concluding remarks.

---

[1]   In this report, technical assistance (TA) refers to the transfer, adaptation, mobilisation and utilisation of services, skills, knowledge and technology. It includes both short- and long-term personnel from both national and foreign sources, plus training, support equipment, consultancies, study visits, seminars and various forms of linkage.

[2]   The full report is available on the ECDPM website (http://www.ecdpm.org/en//pubs/ta_case_studies.htm). Hard copies can be requested by email (to Jacquie Croucher, jc@ecdpm.org), in writing (to EDCPM, Onze Lieve Vrouweplein 21, 6211 HE Maastricht, The Netherlands), by telephone (+31-43-350 2918) or by fax (+31-43-350 2902).

2   Background

In the mid-1990s, the international development community began to devise policy and procedural reforms to bring a new style and direction to development cooperation. These reforms, which were selectively implemented by most IDOs, included the sector investment programme (SIP) used mainly by the World Bank, and the sector-wide approach (SWAp) favoured by a number of bilateral donors.[3] Both mechanisms were designed to introduce more coherent planning and implementation of development interventions at the sector level, according to the priorities set out by the national government, and to reduce the administrative burden on all development partners.

Within these collaborative arrangements, the mechanism of pooling funds and other kinds of resources to pay for TA, both outside and within SWAps, has been proposed as a means to reduce the fragmentation of development activities and to create more space for country leadership.

The term *TA pooling* is used in this report to refer to an activity with three key characteristics:
- there must be some collective action among IDOs and national participants with the goal of producing a development result;
- there must be some sort of sharing or transfer of resources amongst the participants; and
- the pooling activity must be explicitly designed to support the agreed policy objectives of the partner country.

---

[3]   *A sector-wide approach (SWAp)* is a method of working between and amongst governments, development organisations and some non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in which significant funding for a particular sector is provided to support an agreed sector policy and expenditure programme, under government leadership, using common approaches across the sector.

3 Current Status and Contribution of TA Pooling in Six Countries

The study involved six country cases – Botswana, Ethiopia, Mali, Mozambique, Tanzania and Uganda – focusing on the management of technical assistance and collaborative efforts such as pooling. The number of TA pooling schemes is small but increasing in most of these countries, except in Mali, where collaboration among donors is limited, and in Botswana, which has succeeded in integrating external aid resources into its national planning process.

The current status and contribution of these small levels of TA pooling can be summarised as follows:

- Serious *capacity shortages* in most of the countries reviewed (for example, there is not one qualified accountant[4] in the government of Mozambique) have slowed progress in pooling of TA. Such shortages are exacerbated by complex coordination mechanisms, such as SWAps, which may result in pressures for additional TA to fill the capacity gaps. *Although the goal of SWAps is to increase ownership by the developing country, the result can sometimes be the opposite,* especially when large numbers of TA personnel effectively take control.

- The gradual increase in the use of TA pooling is *not yet having a major impact on national ownership,* although collaborative schemes do generally reduce fragmentation, create more space for national ownership and have symbolic benefits. On the other hand, IDOs have initiated many schemes, and it was not immediately apparent that the developing countries felt ownership towards them. *Small, context-aware and context-sensitive initiatives, following an incremental approach to reform, stand a better chance of success* than grand, ambitious and one-size-fits-all schemes. They may also generate a greater sense of ownership.

- The *use of TA pooling, by itself, does not appear to lower the overall expenditures on TA*, especially in the early years of collaborative programmes such as SWAps. In addition, despite hopes that TA pooling would enable national governments to source TA from countries where expertise is cheaper, such as in Asia, there has been *no apparent lowering of the costs of TA*. Despite the rhetoric about untying, *many of the countries that provide development assistance are reluctant to untie aid flows,* since this might shift procurement either to developing countries or to other OECD countries. Furthermore, *local TA, especially in Africa, is becoming increasingly expensive.*

- The assessment of TA pooling shows that the *efficiency gains are mixed*. Most collaborative initiatives have proven to be far more labour intensive, time-consuming and organisationally complex than their advocates had predicted. This is especially true of SWAps that in some cases have incurred transaction costs at a level that is difficult to justify. There are, however, some emerging signs of efficiency gains as both governments and IDOs learn about the performance factors that shape TA pooling in different situations.

- In some cases, TA pooling highlights the comparative advantages and costs of different providers, and thus *increases transparency*. In general, the sharing of information about TA can give all development partners a better sense of the purposes, potential contributions and comparative costs of various TA packages. In this sense, TA pooling

---

[4] At a level equivalent to chartered accountant, certified public accountant or 'revisor official de contas'. World Bank (2001) *Draft Mozambique Country Financial Accountability Assessment* (p.6).

can serve to introduce more subtle competition into TA supply, and can encourage development partners to catch up with their counterparts in the public and private sectors for whom such 'mix and match' collaboration has long been standard practice.

- There is *some* evidence of a *correlation between the use of TA pooling and the crafting of better sector strategies and policies*. But it is important not to overstate the impact of TA pooling on the development of broader programme strategies. Deeper structural trends in collaborative activities – such as the improved donor–government climate in Tanzania – are of far greater importance.

We can sum up the current status and contribution of pooled TA in four of the six countries (excluding Botswana and Mali) as follows. Its use is growing as both governments and IDOs shift to more collaborative ways of designing and managing development interventions. All the development partners are experimenting with different types of pooled TA and are learning about their comparative advantages and downsides. By itself, pooled TA is not a decisive innovation, but as part of a broader set of combined reforms, it can make a useful contribution.

4 Factors Shaping TA Pooling

In the countries examined for this research, five interrelated factors appear to be shaping the level of use and performance of TA pooling:

- the policies and organisational context within the country;
- the attitudes within international development organisations in relation to TA pooling;
- the relationship between the national government and the international development organisations;
- the relationships among international development organisations; and
- the design and management of sector programme support.

4.1 The Policies and Organisational Context within the Country

Most governments encourage the use of multiple funding channels for financing TA within sector programmes. At the same time, many emphasise the importance of controlling the purpose and use of TA as opposed to its procurement and contracting. This policy position implicitly recognises the burden that the latter functions place on administrative and financial management systems. For the IDOs, the fear of misuse of funds and concerns about financial accountability as a result of these systems becoming outdated or overburdened are major factors that are shaping the scale and type of involvement in pooling arrangements.

Government officials are often less enthusiastic about TA pooling than are some IDOs. Some are cautious about the management implications of shifting rapidly to the kind of pooling covered by the definition of TA pooling that appeared in the terms of reference for this study (see the Introduction).[5] Others are concerned about the possibility of reducing flexibility by increasing the barriers to switching TA from one activity to another as and when needed. Yet others see TA pooling as a means of reducing the overall amount of official development assistance (ODA) coming into the country. In addition, sectoral ministries are often more cautious than central ministries such as finance and planning, a reflection in part of the perennial debate between control by the centre versus autonomy at the operational level. Decentralisation adds another complication because it raises the question of which level of government should decide on TA issues, including those to do with pooling, in countries where planning and management capacities are generally less well developed at decentralised levels than at the national level.

4.2 Attitudes within International Development Organisations in Reference to TA Pooling

The attitudes of the IDOs in reference to TA pooling are influenced by three interconnected factors: policy and procedural restrictions, the strategies developed by IDOs for the use of TA, and the incentives within these organisations to change their approaches. Conservative TA strategies and organisational incentives that do not clearly support pooling have discouraged collaboration in some countries such as Mali (see Box 1). A number of IDOs are slowly shifting to, and experimenting with pooling arrangements, but many are also under domestic pressure to earmark their interventions and 'prove' the value of 'their' results. Many

---

[5] Most governments have not thought much about dedicated TA pools, especially within SWAps. But there is a general feeling that such an approach should not be encouraged for fear of draining funds away from other SWAp investments that would be of greater interest to national partners.

IDOs still regard the use of projects as the most effective way to deal with the issue of attribution.

Box 1: Mali – Slow Moves towards Collaboration

The OECD's Development Assistance Committee (DAC) commissioned an aid review in Mali covering the period 1996–98. One of the main conclusions centred on the fragmentation of development interventions and the cumulative impact of over one thousand separate official visits, monitoring missions and evaluations each year. In response, the government of Mali set up an Aid Reform Secretariat in the Ministry of Finance with a mandate to review organisational structures, strategies and procedures. The international development organisations (IDOs) were also requested to consider ways to improve harmonisation within the system.

The aid reform process was intended to help the Malian authorities coordinate and manage aid more effectively, but after two years the results have been mixed. The planned institutional reforms have been slow to materialise, and the IDOs have made little progress in harmonising aid practices. On the other hand, there have been agreements on the level of per diems paid to national consultants, and on the creation of a consultation framework for the overhaul of cooperation mechanisms. The process has also facilitated a dialogue on a handbook of procedures for the Health and Social Development Programme (Prodess).

Prodess is one of the few activities that encourages dialogue among the parties involved, particularly through the Health Partners' Group, which was set up for the purpose. Together with the Ministry of Health, the Group has undertaken to find solutions to problems related to:
- the establishment of a joint fund and management of programme finances;
- the transfer of powers and delegation of responsibilities to decentralised bodies; and
- the switch from a project to a programme approach.

On the other hand, Prodess has been criticised for its subservience to planning tools, which has caused delays in implementation, especially with regard to the disbursement of funds. The programme suffers from a lack of clear guidelines on the mobilisation and use of TA, and would benefit from a single, effective TA coordination and management structure.

Although it is probably premature to talk of pooling TA in Mali, a series of measures could be introduced to ensure more rational and effective use of external assistance. There is an urgent need to discuss both technical aspects (such as staff profiles) and financial aspects so that TA can more easily be channelled to priority areas. It is also important to incorporate TA into permanent government structures, in order to avoid a proliferation of parallel structures that would be a drain on the country's resources.

4.3 The Relationship between the National Government and the International Development Organisations

A productive aid relationship between the national government and the international development community inspires trust and leads to a willingness to experiment with a wider range of innovations such as TA pooling. IDOs that are reassured about the overall results of their investments will be less inclined to engage in individual efforts to control them. TA pooling needs an environment of positive collective action to go forward, as can be seen in the case of Tanzania (Box 2).

Box 2: Tanzania – A Collective Endeavour Needs Clear Rules

By late 1994, relations between the government of Tanzania and the international development organisations (IDOs) had become strained and unproductive despite more than 30 years of cooperation. In 1995, the Danish government hired a team of five trusted interlocutors, both foreign and Tanzanian, to suggest improvements that would be considered by both the government and the IDOs. The resulting report put forward a set of operating rules or code of practice to manage the relationship, plus a set of issues whose resolution would be regularly monitored by independent advisers.[6]

The new arrangements put the government in the lead in managing the aid relationship, a move aimed at improving coherence and reducing fragmentation. Fora have been put in place at central agency and sector levels for collective dialogue in problem solving in order to build trust and transparency.[7] The performance of both the government and the IDOs is assessed and graded on a regular basis. In contrast with the Botswana model, the Tanzanian approach sees the aid relationship as more of a collective endeavour, which needs clear rules of the game and a means of mediating disputes.

4.4 Relationships among International Development Organisations

TA pooling is more likely in countries where a group of IDOs have a common vision and a tradition of working in collaborative arrangements. In Tanzania and Uganda, for example, a cohesive group of 'like-minded' donors, mostly from Europe, have participated in SWAps and in some form of TA pooling.

4.5 The Design and Management of Sector Programme Support

Sector mechanisms are a form of collective action. At each stage of their development, careful management and the right kind of organisational incentives are required in order to sustain the shared trust that underpins their functioning. Caution is needed in moving to forms of pooling that require heavy management commitments and specialised personnel, especially in the absence of both policy changes in the international community and improvements in the organisational capacities in poor countries. The more successful programmes, such as the education programme in Uganda (see Box 3), have tried to evolve through stages of increasing collaboration. They have found that too much initial enthusiasm may lead to disappointment and a reluctance to try again. The involvement of too many development organisations, especially early in the life of a sector support programme, can also stifle initiative and dilute action.

---

[6] The Tanzanian government and the development organisations have recently agreed to institutionalise the process by forming an advisory group with two donor-nominated representatives, two government-nominated representatives and one from the wider African community.

[7] There are currently 15 aid coordination sub-groups involving IDOs and the Tanzanian government.

Box 3: Uganda – The Move towards Integration Faces Constraints

Uganda is moving towards the integration of aid contributions under a single country development framework. The country has a clear national agenda and the Ministry of Finance has insisted on the adoption of sector-wide approaches, investment programming and medium-term expenditure frameworks. Tripartite meetings, attended by representatives of the Ministry, international development organisations (IDOs) and line ministries, are arranged to help shape sector programmes. The line ministries manage sector coordination and provide policy guidance to local authorities. Budget support is promoted as a way to pool aid into the budget and Ministries have taken the lead in putting in place frameworks to be shared by IDOs. Principles, guidelines, codes of conduct and legal frameworks have been developed to govern the operations of both these organisations and recipients, and to consolidate their relationships. There is a reasonably well developed consultative process and the consultative meetings held to date have been attended by high-level government representatives.

On the other hand, there are some serious constraints to a stronger Ugandan role:
- the lack of capacity, particularly at the ministerial or sector and district levels, to provide guidance to the process;
- discomfort on the part of some IDOs about being involved in new aid delivery mechanisms; and
- a shortage of sufficiently well developed instruments and mechanisms to support the process.

In addition, because Uganda depends heavily on development assistance, it does not have the margin enjoyed by Botswana (see Box 5 below) to reject contributions by IDOs that are not willing to participate in harmonisation efforts. The Ugandan approach is thus one of 'give and take' and 'leading and compromising on the role of donors'.[8] The government of Uganda has therefore taken a flexible stand in terms of harmonising aid interventions, and allows some IDOs to participate in SWAps even if they do not accept the generally agreed conditions.

---

[8] See Uganda case study, *Study on Pooling of Technical Assistance in the Context of Sector-Wide Approaches* (http://www.capacity.org/12/case_study_uganda.htm).

5   Suggested Improvements in Support of TA Pooling

Having looked at the current status of TA pooling and the factors that affect its application, this report now offers some suggestions for improving the mechanism. Most of these recommendations are still preliminary and will require more in-depth analysis and experimentation before they can be described as tested reforms.

Move ahead with the restructuring of relationships between partner countries and IDOs
TA pooling can function on its own as a useful device to help achieve positive development results at the project, programme and sector levels. But it can also contribute to, and benefit from, the ongoing reforms of development cooperation, sometimes referred to as the 'new paradigm'[9]. As these reforms take hold and spread, more scope will hopefully be created to move ahead with TA pooling, particularly full pooling. At the heart of these reforms is the need to restructure the overall development cooperation relationship, placing more emphasis on country leadership, national and local demand, mutual learning and more coordinated action amongst all participants. In many of the countries we visited, this shift is already under way.

Specific actions could include the following:
- Partner countries could create an international forum, equivalent to the OECD's Development Assistance Committee (DAC), for formulation, discussion and agreement on reforms to development cooperation.
- Organisations responsible for meetings of national aid groups and consortia could put the issue of restructuring broader relationships between partner countries and IDOs on their agendas as a permanent item.
- IDOs and national research organisations could document, analyse and disseminate the results of experiments with new forms of development cooperation management at the field level.

Encourage a climate that is more supportive of pooling and collective action at the field level
Over the past few decades, some of the rules of development cooperation have coalesced to create a style of operation that is biased against collective action, including TA pooling. In some situations, individual action by a development organisation is still appropriate; indeed, it is not suggested that all projects and programmes must be squeezed into some kind of forced collaboration. In cases where it is beyond the capacity of a single development organisation to address a complex, multi-faceted situation, a coordinated effort by a number of organisations may be more appropriate. In undertaking such collective action, these organisations will need to pool their knowledge, ideas, insights and promising (as opposed to 'best') practices, and to share accountability for the results. It will also necessitate a rethinking of conventional approaches to results-based management in an effort to move away from individual organisational efforts to take credit and demonstrate value. The preparatory stage of the Ethiopian education programme (see Box 4) is an example of an effort to build such a collaborative climate.

Pooling must be seen as just one mechanism within a combination of approaches that could include budget support, basket funding, and programme and project support. In certain cases, projects with a narrow focus, including those relying on tied aid, can provide national partners with opportunities for innovation and learning that would not be available in broad collective approaches. The challenge is to ensure that such project-based interventions are fed into

---

[9]   Supporting poverty reduction through direct budget support in the long term and sector programme support in the medium term.

mainstream operations. In this regard, the pooling of ideas and interests may matter as much as the pooling of more tangible resources.

Specific actions could include the following:
- National governments and partners could encourage IDOs to collaborate wherever appropriate. In some of the countries we visited, there appeared to be a 'tipping point'[10] beyond which IDOs perceived that their interests would be better served by being part of a collective effort than remaining outside and acting alone.
- Central ministries in partner countries frequently need to persuade line agencies to enter into pooled arrangements rather than to continue with 'one-off' projects with selected IDOs. Central ministries need to think through and alter the pattern of incentives and habits that constrain the shift toward more pooling within governments.

Box 4: Ethiopia – Is Collaboration Taking Off?*

Between May 1997 and February 1998, three multi-donor missions visited Ethiopia to assist with the preparations for the Education Sector Development Programme (ESDP). Sub-teams of international specialists were engaged to offer technical assistance in each of the 11 programme components. Interested international development organisations (IDOs) were invited to appoint specialists to one or more of the sub-teams and to act as the lead for one component. The World Bank led the preparatory missions, at the request of the government of Ethiopia and other international development organisations. By the final mission, 15 organisations were involved, mostly via specialists hired as independent consultants specifically for the ESDP.

When interviewed in 1999, the participants were unanimous that the broad participation and the careful preparations had had a very positive impact. Among other results, the process was also seen as having produced strong and determined ownership on the part of the Ethiopian government, a significant level of decentralised planning, considerably enhanced capacity in the education sector, and improved coordination among the IDOs involved.

Unfortunately, the ESDP was put on hold when hostilities with Eritrea broke out. In recent months, discussions have begun again and the like-minded bilateral donors have decided to initiate common funding arrangements for both the education and health sectors. A working paper is to be presented to these donors, although a recent reorganisation of ministries may slow the process.

_____
* Adapted from Martin *et al.* (2000) *Preparation of the Education Sector Development Programme in Ethiopia*.

Experiment with new models of TA interventions
The current tendency in some development cooperation circles is to reject TA as unnecessary, particularly in the form of long-term expatriate TA. But in a world in which the exchange of knowledge and ideas is a driving force of most international activities, and all countries are competing for skills and intellectual capability on a global basis, we see little merit in reducing TA for its own sake, regardless of the underlying need. In countries such as Mozambique capacity gaps are increasing and TA can continue to play a useful role even in filling operational gaps. Botswana provides an interesting example of how this can be done under national direction and ownership (Box 5).

Specific issues to be addressed include the following:
- In many instances, TA remains a supply – technical solution – donor-driven activity that responds more to the requirements and incentives of the IDOs than it does to national

---

[10] From *The Tipping Point* by Malcom Gladwell, Little, Brown and Company, 2000.

demands and incentives. Breaking this entrenched supply pattern should be a top priority in any effort to reform TA.

- TA needs to be reshaped to be part of what one observer has called 'autonomy-respecting' assistance, thus moving away from the organisational engineering and benevolent aid models of the past.[11]

Box 5: Botswana – A Country in the Driver's Seat

Now a middle-income country that receives little donor assistance, Botswana once depended on aid for 45% of its government expenditures. Unlike many aid-dependent countries, Botswana's experience of aid in general and technical cooperation in particular has been positive, largely as a result of its own management approach, which relied on strong country direction and integration of outside assistance into government operations. The Ministry of Finance and Development Planning (MFDP) has always coordinated contacts with external agencies. Although line ministries are free to identify potential partners, they cannot enter into a contract with an international development organisation (IDO). Planning officers, responsible to MFDP, are seconded to all spending ministries and play a leading role in the planning and budgeting process. Additional coordination mechanisms are superfluous, since the national planning system already offers a satisfactory framework.

The approach of the Botswana authorities is based on four key principles:
- All development cooperation is channelled through the national planning and budgeting system. Aid-funded projects must be included in the national development plan, which is approved by parliament, and have assigned budgets and resources.
- All TA, whether free-standing or linked to specific projects, is contracted by the government, integrated into the human resources planning of the public service and assigned to established posts. Separate project and advisory posts are not created.
- The government controls all dealings with international funding agencies on a one-to-one basis. Sectoral ministries do not enter into separate agreements. There are no consultative or roundtable groups. IDOs are encouraged to harmonise their procedures with those of the government.
- The government has proven itself more than willing to refuse offers of assistance that do not meet the needs of Botswana, a stance that is made easier because of large revenues from diamonds.

This approach has allowed the government to remain firmly in the 'driver's seat', to pick and choose, and to match the characteristics and preferences of each IDO to the country's particular needs and sectors. As far as possible, like-minded organisations have been encouraged to work together, and to specialise in particular sectors. This has ensured that no single agency dominates a sector, and at the same time has prevented too many organisations crowding a particular sector. Determined and capable country leadership reduces the choices available to IDOs, and in many ways makes their organisational lives easier.

It should be noted that Botswana finances a considerable number of TA personnel from its own revenues and they are also integrated into government operations.

Combine market-based approaches and TA pooling
The challenge here is to combine competition and choice in the design and provision of TA with some degree of collective action and collaboration among development partners.

Specific actions could include:
- Separating the financing of TA from its provision, design and implementation. The shift to more competitive approaches to TA pooling will succeed only if high-cost suppliers, mainly in the donor countries, accept 'rules of the game' that will allow some large TA contracts to go to lower-cost suppliers.

---

[11] Ellerman, D. (2002) 'Autonomy-respecting assistance: Towards new strategies for capacity building and development assistance', in Fukuda-Parr *et al.*, *Capacity For Development: New Solutions for Old Problems*.

- Including the cost of TA in national and regional budgets may also help to highlight its opportunity costs. More could be done to make many of the hidden costs of TA more transparent.

Develop better frameworks for the design, management and monitoring of TA for capacity development

The provision of TA, in whatever form, should be part of a well conceived approach to organisational change. Despite this obvious need, too many TA approaches remain disconnected from their institutional context, and the bureaucratic and political constraints that may limit progress. With more systematic analytical frameworks, the partners would be better able to identify the gaps, as well as the opportunities for and constraints on improving capacity and performance.

Specific actions could include:
- The design and use of assessment frameworks that can deal with the complex, multi-organisational settings that are typical of pooled arrangements.
- National partners and IDOs also need better frameworks that focus on improving capacity and performance, rather than providing conventional analyses of organisational functions and structures.
- The use of assessment frameworks that can analyse the systemic behaviour of organisations and networks that are still at an early stage of development.

Invest in up-front preparations in support of TA pooling

To be effective, TA pooling appears to require three kinds of support, which can be put in place during the design phase:
- a detailed plan setting out a range of scenarios that may unfold as the programme moves through implementation. Programmes that are prepared for unforeseen circumstances rather than prediction and control seem to offer more promise;
- training/awareness raising to develop the participants' capability for learning and incremental adjustment, to enable the programme to adapt as the underlying contextual factors begin to assert themselves; and
- efforts to encourage the participants to develop a shared sense of purpose. The most effective TA programmes seem to be those in which a cohesive group of participants makes a sustained effort.

Avoid moving too quickly on TA reform efforts or on too grand a scale

In all the countries reviewed for this study there was a consistent pattern of over-ambitious efforts to introduce policy and institutional reforms, driven mainly by a lack of patience with, and awareness of, implementation constraints. IDOs in particular tended to underestimate or ignore the pitfalls that lie in wait for most complex reform efforts. Such efforts can backfire, as was the case in Mali, where IDOs set a highly ambitious reform agenda but after two years had made little progress in implementing it. The result has been disillusionment with the overall process and little enthusiasm to attempt a similar exercise.

Specific operational steps might include the following:
- Study and disseminate a range of cases of complex organisational change, in order to gain a realistic picture of the time and patience that will be needed to effect systemic change.
- Make a clear assessment of the organisational and logistical support at the field level that will be required for effective systemic change, e.g. working groups, dedicated administrative units or a code of conduct. National partners may also need additional resources to design and manage sector support. It is usually wiser to start with small-scale

pooling arrangements before expanding to larger, more complex schemes, as the Mozambique case below illustrates.

Box 6: Mozambique – A Flood of Reforms Drains National Capacity

Within the context of international aid reform, Mozambique can be seen as a laboratory, where most or all concepts, instruments and approaches that are currently promising and fashionable in the development arena are being tested. Most of these imported novelties – including SWAps – have been introduced into the Mozambican scene at the initiative of an international development organisation. Based on its brilliant post-war performance, Mozambique has earned the reputation of being a favourable environment, where 'good policies', in the sense of the World Bank's *Assessing Aid* (1998) prevail, while the fall from grace of other aid-receiving countries has reduced the number of alternatives available to outside funders. The net result has been a proliferation of generously financed initiatives, which have raised enormous expectations, at least within the international development community.

In Mozambique, both in the context of SWAps as well as outside, the overall picture of TA pooling as a new aid mechanism is clearly varied. Many sectors are experimenting with different approaches to rationalising external assistance in order to make it more efficient and effective. The results have been mixed. Some schemes, such as the smaller and more cautiously designed ones at the level of TA pooling within a specific sector, appear to have been more successful. Other schemes show promise, particularly those promoted by ministries who took the initiative to formulate concrete solutions to domestic concerns, with international development organisations responding supportively, rather than pressing for ambitious, imported solutions. Yet others, designed from the macro perspective and intended to change an entire sector through a rather sophisticated programme, have placed enormous stress on all actors concerned. They often impact negatively on ownership and could be best described as being too ambitious and as 'one step too early'.

On balance, none of the schemes stands out as an example of good practice on all counts. The costs to stakeholders of setting up pooling arrangements, particularly in the context of SWAps, tend to be high. Progress has been consistently slow across sectors, and in some cases gains have actually been reversed by moving too fast or on too grand a scale. The major constraint emerging across sectors in the context of pooling is the serious lack of capacity that affects the country, caused by the flood of reforms in the public and private sectors, and by the subsequent demand for different and higher-level skills. Sustained investment in strengthening and expanding the national human resource base, encompassing the entire public sector and the reform of the public service, is certainly the only, but long-term answer to many of the problems identified in Mozambique.

Move ahead on harmonisation of procedures

If IDOs are to engage in more coordinated action, they need to move ahead on the harmonisation of their systems and procedures. A number of international task forces are already looking at the implications of adopting common approaches to reporting, conducting annual reviews, monitoring and evaluation, drafting memoranda of understanding and compensating national consultants. The constraints that are limiting progress in this area include the different degrees of discretion IDOs allow their field officers in devising agreements at the country level, and the inflexibility of accountability standards imposed on the staff of bilateral agencies by domestic financial management departments.

Harmonisation of TA seems to offer most promise in three areas:
- Agreements in which TA personnel funded by external sources report directly to national authorities so that the latter exercise strategic control at the country level.

- Agreements between national governments and IDOs to follow a common set of administrative and financial procedures for programme/project implementation. In some cases, IDOs have agreed to give up detailed scrutiny of individual line items in programme documents in favour of collective discussions and review. This approach will be needed if mechanisms such as SWAps are to be effective in the long term.
- The procurement and contracting of TA personnel, although greater efforts will be needed to achieve harmonisation in this area. Most partner governments do not yet have the capability to procure and contract international TA personnel, including those from donor countries that no longer provide TA directly. If pooling is to be a viable mechanism in the long term, some specialised capability in this area will have to be developed.

Invest in improved monitoring, performance assessment and evaluation as means to foster learning

In the past, TA personnel have helped IDOs to fulfil their accountability requirements, but these control functions will likely diminish as national governments take over the direction of TA to support their own interests. IDOs will then require alternative control arrangements (e.g. improved reporting, monitoring, evaluation and auditing) to provide them with the confidence they need to maintain their financial support.

Some of the operational issues to be addressed include:
- Monitoring and evaluation of capacity development could be more effective by emphasising trends, directions and processes rather than measuring variances against products or targets.
- National partners need to be invited to play a stronger role in the monitoring and evaluation of TA programmes. M&E should focus as much on group learning in the partner country as on control on behalf of IDOs.

6 An Emerging Analytical Framework for Thinking about Pooling

Now that we have looked at the current status of pooling and suggestions for improving it, we need to think of where we go from here. The research demonstrated that there are a number of different kinds of collaboration with regard to TA, and that the definition used in the terms of reference for this study (see the Introduction) does not adequately reflect all of them. The authors therefore suggest three categories of TA pooling:

- *Full* TA pooling: resources and control are transferred to the national partners to the greatest extent, who both contract and direct TA personnel.
- *Mixed* TA pooling: national authorities manage the TA personnel, but the contracting is done by one of the IDOs providing financing.
- *Loose* TA pooling: the direction of TA personnel is shared between the government and IDOs. Personnel are normally contracted individually by one or more IDOs, often on a tied basis. This is the least collaborative of the three approaches.

The elements and characteristics of these three types of TA pooling are compared in Table 1. Further explanations and information on their uses are provided in the Annex.

Table 1. Characteristics of the three types of TA pooling.

	Full pooling	Mixed pooling	Loose pooling
Untied	×	×	×
Tied		×	×
Country procurement and contracting	×		
IDO procurement and contracting		×	×
Country role in strategic management	×	×	Shared with IDOs
IDO role in strategic management			Shared with country

The research carried out for this study suggests that IDOs should be cautious in encouraging one particular form of pooling over another. The essential factor should be the fit or match between the conditions in the country concerned and the type of pooling chosen. As these conditions change over time, the type of pooling adopted may require rethinking. At present, loose pooling is the most common form, reflecting the restrictions faced by some IDOs.

The breakdown of pooling into these three categories permits the design of a framework for analysing different conditions and judging which type of pooling is most appropriate in any given situation. Table 2 presents an analytical framework to assist policy makers in thinking about TA pooling – the advantages of each type, the enabling conditions required and the associated risks. It also suggests situations in which the different types of pooling may be most suitable. The following issues are addressed:

- What are the advantages of each approach for the various participants? And as perceived by whom? Are participants clear about what benefits they have to give up to secure these advantages?
- Which enabling conditions are critical as opposed to merely supportive, particularly with respect to implementation? What will help to make these three pooling approaches work and why?

- What are the risks of the three approaches and how can they be minimised? To what degree can and should they be understood in advance?
- What situations are most suitable for the three types of pooling?

Just as pooling is a new mechanism and serious reflection about it is still limited, Table 2 is an instrument that will require testing and modification.

Table 2. A framework for thinking about TA pooling

Type of TA arrangement		
FULL POOLING	**MIXED POOLING**	**LOOSE POOLING**
ADVANTAGES (may be perceived differently by different stakeholders)		
• Government in charge and makes decisions on what TA should lead to improved management skills and reinforced ownership • Can reduce coordination costs between IDOs and gov't in the long-term • Can reduce competition among IDOs • Complete transparency provides opportunity to compare costs of TA from different sources • Less opportunity for IDOs to put non-development demands on TA staff • (For central government agencies) funding is usually on budget and is centrally controlled • Allows IDOs to support objectives in areas where they have no comparative advantage	• May require less time to put in place than full pooling • Relieves gov'ts with limited procurement and contracting skills of some management responsibility • Can reduce coordination costs between IDOs and the gov't in the long term • Less risk for donors • Reporting to donors may be easier than with full pooling • (For sectoral ministries) control is more decentralised • Allows IDOs to support objectives in areas where they have no comparative advantage	• May be put in place relatively quickly and thus can support strategic innovations • Little pressure on local management systems • TA often chosen by common agreement to reflect recognised national or individual competencies of donor countries • (Perversely) gov'ts may be more willing to admit local capacity gaps and use international TA if the costs are not known • Off-line nature provides funding for activities not funded through the central system • Since requirements are less onerous, a broader range of IDOs can be involved • (For sectoral ministries) control is more decentralised • (For donors who must show attribution) the role of each donor is evident and reporting is through their own systems
ENABLING CONDITIONS		
• Good preparatory work among IDOs and gov't to produce stakeholder consensus on a sectoral strategy and on an M&E strategy • Good relations between gov't and IDOs • Willingness of IDOs to take risks • Full untying authority • Willingness of gov't ministries to give up individual projects • Reasonably competent and honest local management who are not overburdened with other activities • Solid gov't procurement procedures for both domestic and international purchasing	• Good preparatory work among IDOs and gov't to produce stakeholder consensus on sectoral and M&E strategies • Reasonable relations between gov't and IDOs • Some willingness on part of IDOs to take risks • Willingness of gov't ministries to give up individual projects • One IDO prepared to take the lead and set up fund	• Easy to put in place - agreement only among a limited number of IDOs on the appropriate use of TA

Table 2 (*continued*)

Type of TA arrangement		
FULL POOLING	**MIXED POOLING**	**LOOSE POOLING**

RISKS

FULL POOLING	**MIXED POOLING**	**LOOSE POOLING**
- Can take a long time to put in place - Lowest common denominator thinking can lead to less innovation - Individual foreign TA may be unwilling to sign contracts with individual governments - Political pressure to divert funds for other uses - Procurement and financial systems not adequate to resist corruption - Inadequate local expertise to meet all TA needs, resulting in rising costs - Pressures to use local or regional TA even if inappropriate or overly costly - Funds sometimes deducted from central budget allocations to individual ministries, thus reducing ministry interest	- No opportunity to build up local procurement capacities through experience - Pool could be led by IDO, thus undermining local ownership - Little transparency on costs - Tendency to use more international TA than is necessary because of tied funding	- No opportunity to build up local management capacities - The government's needs and preferences may not be given adequate attention, resulting in a lack of ownership - Pressure to use international TA, even if inappropriate, because of tied funding - No transparency with regard to costs - Harder for gov'ts to coordinate - Possibility of overwhelming gov'ts - IDOs have more opportunity to start their own initiatives, which may not respect gov't priorities

WHERE SUITABLE

FULL POOLING	**MIXED POOLING**	**LOOSE POOLING**
- Where amortisation of up-front transaction costs is possible over large activity - Where there is a high degree of trust between the gov't and IDOs - When hiring small numbers of individual TA staff (many IDOs may be reluctant to open large contracts to international tendering because they would lose out to lower-priced competitors) - When hiring national TA is a priority - When linkages between foreign TA and specific IDOs may indicate a lack of objectivity - Where the gov't has good procurement capacities as well as an overall vision	- Where amortisation of up-front transaction costs is possible over a medium to large activity - Where the trust between the gov't and IDOs is weaker than in cases of full pooling, or IDOs have not developed strong collaborative mechanisms in the country concerned - Where considerable international TA is appropriate - Where IDOs have comparative advantages that can be utilised - Where the government's management and procurement capacity is weak, but where there is an overall strategic vision	- When activities are small and heavy transaction costs can not be amortised - Where there is little trust between the gov't and IDOs, or where IDOs have not developed strong collaborative mechanisms in the country concerned - Where untying authority is severely restricted

7 Conclusions

This report has attempted to answer the questions in the Introduction concerning the utility of pooling, the degree of ownership supporting it, the capacity required, and its contribution to changes in aid management practices. This review has shown that although the mechanism of pooling of TA is still in its infancy, there are some modest but promising signs in several of the countries reviewed. It is not a panacea and certainly not the new religion. The framework in section 6 suggests some conditions that contribute to successful pooling and the risks to be addressed, including some capacity and procedural issues. Whether or not pooling promotes country ownership will depend to a large extent on the origin of the initiative, and the capacities that are available to support it. Finding the right balance is critical.

The move to pooling is part of a broader process of change in the design and management of international development cooperation, at the core of which is the emphasis on country ownership and control. In the years ahead the challenge will be to encourage more pooling that promotes such ownership and control, while at the same time maintaining quality programming and ensuring effective implementation. At the same time, pooling of TA can not be de-linked from structural reform efforts (e.g. public sector reforms). It also can only be implemented in an environment with adequate capacity to direct the process, or where the necessary capacities can be created within a reasonably short time span, e.g. through special incentive schemes to attract capable individuals into the civil service.

Annex: Explanations of Full, Mixed and Loose Pooling

In Table A.1 below, we have attempted to assign the various examples of pooling identified during the course of the study into the three types: full, mixed and loose. The information in this table should be regarded as indicative only, since a final assignment of each activity would require an in-depth knowledge that was not possible to acquire within the time limitations of this study. In addition, there is always potential for pools to move from one category to another, depending on the requirements at different times of the country and of the IDOs involved.

Full TA pooling

As Table A.1 shows, examples of full TA pooling are found in four of the six countries, usually focusing on the provision of national personnel and individual foreign contract staff. Full pooling is the option in which resources and control are transferred to the national partners to the greatest extent, who both contract and direct TA personnel. All examples of full pooling – indeed of all types of TA – remain 'off-budget'.[12]

- In Ethiopia, the Social Sectors TA Fund was to be an untied pool of funds at the disposal of the government, but its implementation was halted when hostilities with Eritrea broke out and the flow of aid funds largely dried up. Another proposal, also stalled, was to provide the Ethiopian Civil Service Reform Programme (CSRP) with access to an untied pool of TA funds.
- In Tanzania, we found two examples of full pooling, both of which had to do with public sector reform. Under the Local Government Reform Basket Fund, a non-SWAp arrangement, individual expatriates have been hired using a set of procedures agreed to by all the Fund participants.[13] Similarly, the Tanzanian Performance Improvement Fund works through a complex system of technical committees and working groups to hire national and international TA.

Mixed TA pooling

Mixed TA pooling involving two or more IDOs is increasing slowly in four of the countries, with Mali and Botswana being the exceptions. National authorities manage the TA, but the contracting is done by one of the IDOs providing financing. Some observers predicted that this category of pooling would not grow rapidly, given the possible appearance of 'cartels' of IDOs that could overwhelm the government.

- In Mozambique, the now suspended Pooling Agreement for Technical Assistance (PATA) was funded by the Netherlands, Norway and Switzerland, with UNDP managing the contracting and payment of salaries. The Ministry of Health provided strategic management in terms of identifying the need for TA personnel, and for their selection, supervision and assessment.
- In Uganda, in the Human Rights and Democratisation Project, the European Union (EU) and DANIDA have pooled their resources and provide most of the TA through an implementation unit established by DANIDA. The EU has also supplied some TA staff whose salaries are paid outside the programme pool.

---

[12] TA makes up about 24% of all ODA to Tanzania and virtually all is deployed 'off-budget'. But it is important to avoid sharp distinctions between financial flows that are 'on-budget' and 'off-budget'. In Mozambique, some external funds were known to government financing authorities but were not included in the state budget. In effect, they were 'on' in terms of financial management, but 'off' in terms of legal and accounting procedures.

[13] The actual contracting of international TA personnel for the Local Government Reform Basket Fund is done by the Ministry of Local Government using an open competitive process.

Loose TA pooling

Loose pooling is the most common form of provision of TA. It is the least collaborative of the three approaches, and the direction of the TA personnel is shared between the IDOs and the government. Personnel are normally contracted individually by one of more IDOs, often on a tied basis. The authors of the Tanzania case study report predict that in the years ahead, loose pooling will increase more rapidly in that country than either the full or the mixed types.

- In Tanzania, an example of loose pooling is the coordinated effort to provide election support, involving CIDA, DANIDA, DFID, DGIS, FINNIDA and Sida. In the health SWAp, the terms of reference and consultants' reports are discussed jointly by the SWAp partners, most of whom are engaged in loose pooling.
- In Ethiopia, IDOs are providing long-term TA for an integrated roads programme through individual agreements with the government.

Table A.1. Examples of pooling identified in the course of the study.

Full pooling	Mixed pooling	Loose pooling
Botswana Rather than encouraging pooling or even collaboration among donors, Botswana has taken an entirely different approach to TA. Its system is characterised by two main features. First, almost all external resources have been integrated into the national planning and budgeting system. Thus, there are no separate systems for aid and for nationally funded activities. Second, TA has been integrated into the public service establishment. Human resources planning and budgeting are integral parts of the national planning process, falling under the responsibility of the Directorate of Public Service Management (DPSM). In this respect, DPSM takes charge of the recruitment of expatriates and oversees the process of localisation. TA personnel have been a core component of aid flows, in view of the country's dire skills shortages, and have played a significant role in strengthening the technical and delivery capacities of the public services. The fragmentation that is characteristic of the aid programmes of many developing countries has not been a problem in Botswana, and there has been no felt need for coordinating mechanisms such as pooling.		
Ethiopia • Social Sectors TA Fund (not yet implemented) • Fiscal reform programme in the Ministry of Finance		• Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development Fund for Capacity Building
Mali We were unable to identify any activities that could be categorised as pooling using the definitions adopted in this report.		
Mozambique • Gabinete de Estudos • Education sector strategic plan (under development) • Health strategic plan • PROAGRI	• Finance (Tribunal das Contas) • PATA	• Capacity building for the police
Tanzania • Local Government Reform Basket Fund • Performance Improvement Fund	• Policy Analysis Capacity Building	• Health SWAp • Public Service Reform Programme • Local Government Reform Programme • Tax Administration Project • Public Expenditure Review and Medium-term Expenditure Framework
Uganda • TA pooling in education	• Human rights and democratisation • TA pooling in health sector • TA pooling in education	

Bibliography

Action Aid, 2001. *ODA and Aid Effectiveness: Fighting Poverty Together.* London: Action Aid.

Baser, H. S.a. *Back to the Basics: What Problem is Technical Assistance Trying to Resolve? A Proposal to DAC Govnet.* Mimeo.

Bossuyt, J., 2001. *Mainstreaming Institutional Development: Why Is It Important and How Can It Be Done?* Mimeo.

Bossuyt, J. *et al.*, 2000. *Assessing Trends in EC Development Policy: An Independent Review of the European Commission's External Aid Reform Process*. ECDPM Discussion Paper 16. Maastricht: ECDPM.

Brautigam, D., 2000. *Aid Dependence and Governance* (EGDI Study, 2000:1). Stockholm: Almkvist and Wiksell International.

Brown, A. *et al*., 2000. *The Status of Sector-wide Approaches.* Working Paper 142. London: ODI.

Burki, O., 2001. *Sector-wide Approach in Tanzania: The Health Sector Example - Observations from a Bilateral, End of Assignment Report.* Berne: Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation.

Cassels, A., 1997. *A Guide to Sector-Wide Approaches to Health Development: Concepts, Issues and Working Arrangements.* Geneva: WHO.

Colombo, S., Modol, X. and Burki, O., 2000. *External Evaluation of the SDN Health Programme, Mozambique 1989-1999.* Berne: Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation.

Crown Agents, and the Institutional Development Group, 2001. *Donor Accountability Study: A study regarding the harmonisation of the donor accountability requirements for general and sector budget support (including SWAps) in the areas of commitments, disbursements, reporting and audit.* Mimeo.

DAC, 1999. *Development cooperation review of Denmark.* Development Cooperation Review Series 33. Paris: OECD.

DAC, 1999. *Development cooperation review of Ireland.* Development Cooperation Review Series 35. Paris: OECD.

DAC, 1999. *Development cooperation review of Japan.* Development Cooperation Review Series 34. Paris: OECD.

DAC, 2000. Development cooperation review of France*. DAC Journal,* 1(3).

DAC, 2000. Development cooperation review of Sweden. *DAC Journal*, 1(4).

DAC, 2000. Development cooperation review of Switzerland. *DAC Journal*, 1(4).

DAC, 2001. Development cooperation 2000 report. *DAC Journal*, 2(1).

DAC, 2001. Development cooperation review of the Netherlands. *DAC Journal*, 2(3).

Development Cooperation Directorate, OECD, 2001. *Task Force on Donor Practices: Summary Record of the Second Meeting Held in Paris on 7-8 June 2001*. Mimeo.

DFID, S.a. *Change Models: Guidance Note (draft for discussion, Governance Group).* London: DFID. Mimeo.

ECDPM, 1999. *Linking Sector-wide Approaches with Capacity*. Capacity.org, 3. Maastricht: ECDPM.

Ellerman, D., 'Autonomy-respecting assistance: Towards new strategies for capacity building and development assistance', in Fukuda-Parr, S., Lopes, C. and Malik, K., *Capacity For Development: New Solutions for Old Problems*, London: Earthscan, 2002.

Fass-Metz, F., 2001. *Donor Accountability Study (draft report).* Bonn: Bundesministerium für Wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung. Mimeo.

Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ), 2000. *Establishment of Priorities in Development Cooperation.* Bonn: Bundesministerium für Wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung.

Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ), 2000. *Recommendation Regarding the Concentration of Activities in the Context of Selecting Focal Areas as part of BMZ Country Programming,* Bonn: Bundesministerium für Wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung.

Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2001. *Operationalisation of Development Policy Objectives in Finland's International Development Cooperation: Government Decision-In-Principle.* Helsinki: Department for International Development Cooperation.

Forss, K., 1999. *Sector-wide Approaches to Development: From Principle to Practice.* Dublin: Department of Foreign Affairs.

Foster, M., Thornton, P. and Brown, A., 2000. *Andhra Pradesh: Sector Approaches for Human Development.* London: ODI.

Gasper, D., 1999. *Evaluating the Logical Framework Approach: Towards Learning-oriented Development Evaluation.* Working Paper Series 303. The Hague: ISS.

Godfrey, M., 2000. *Technical Assistance and Capacity Development in an Aid-dependent Economy: The Experience of Cambodia.* Working Paper 15. Phnom Penh: Cambodia Development Resource Institute.

Grindle, M.S. (ed.), 1980. *Politics and Policy Implementation in the Third World.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Gunnarsson, C., 2001. *Capacity Building, Institutional Crisis and the Issue of Recurrent Cost: Synthesis Report.* Stockholm: Almkvist and Wiksell International.

Hauck, V., 2001. *Notes on Visits to the Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ, Bonn) and GTZ (Eschborn).* Maastricht: ECDPM. Mimeo.

Helleiner, G., 1999. *Changing Aid Relationships in Tanzania (December 1997 through March 1999).* S.l.: S.n.

Helleiner, G., 2000. *Tanzania Assistance Strategy: Critical Issues, presented at the Consultative Group Meeting, 22-26 May 2000.* Mimeo.

Helleiner, G. *et al.,* 1995. *Report of the Group of Independent Advisers on Development Cooperation between Tanzania and its Aid Donors.* Copenhagen: Royal Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Herfkens, E., 2001. *Remarks on the Future of Technical Assistance and Capacity Building to World Development Institute breakfast, Washington DC, 30 April 2001.* The Hague: Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Hill, P.S., S.a. *The Rhetoric of Sector-wide Approaches for Health Development.* Mimeo.

Hobbs, G., 2001. *The Health Sector-wide Approach and Health Sector Basket Fund.* Final report. Dar es Salaam: Economic and Social Research Foundation.

Jackson, E.T., 2001. *Operationalising Results-based Management in Sector-wide Approaches: Focusing on the Performance Review Framework.* Paper presented to the Forum on SWAps and Accountability in CIDA, 24 January 2001. S.l.: S.n.

Jeppson, A., 2000. *SWAp in a Decentralised Context: Some Experiences from Uganda.* Mimeo.

Kanbur, R., Sandler, T. and Morrison, K.M., 1999. *The Future of Development Assistance: Common Pools and International Public Goods.* Policy Essay 25. Washington: ODC.

Kaul, I., Grunberg, I. and Stern, M. (eds), 1999. *Global Public Goods: International Cooperation in the Twenty-first Century*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Lauckner, K., 2001. *Technical Assistance in the Context of the Health SWAp in Tanzania (draft discussion paper)*. Mimeo.

Manning, R.G.M., 2001. *Harmonisation of Operational Policies, Procedures, and Practices: First Progress Report*. London: Department for International Development.

Martin, J., Oksanen, R. and Takala, T., 2000. *Preparation of the Education Sector Development Programme in Ethiopia*. Paris: ADEA.

Mayne, J., 1999. *Addressing Attribution through Contribution Analysis: Using Performance Measures Sensibly*. Discussion paper. Ottawa: Office of the Auditor General of Canada.

Mildeberger, E., 1999. *Capacity Building for Sustainable Development: Concepts, Strategies and Instruments of the German Technical Cooperation (GTZ)*. Eschborn: GTZ.

Mule, H. and Kiragu, K., 2000. *Uganda: Towards Effective and Sustainable Capacity Building: A Study Paper*. S.l.: S.n.

Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2000. *Donor Harmonisation and Adjustment of the Financial Management and Control Procedures under Sector Programmes*. Workshop Report. The Hague: Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2000. *The Sectoral Approach*. The Hague: Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Nielsen, H. S.a. *Sector Programme Support in Decentralised Government Systems: A Contextual Donor Challenge*. Copenhagen: DANIDA.

Noman, A., 1996. *Sector Investment Programmes in Africa: A Review of Implementation Experience*. Washington: World Bank.

OCDE, 2001. *Analyse des résultats du questionnaire sur la gestion de l'aide: Burkina Faso, Ghana, Mali et Senegal*. Rapport de synthèse, Club du Sahel et de l'Afrique de l'Ouest. Paris: OCDE.

Oksanen, R. and Lönnqvist, A., 1998. *Harmonising Requirements and Procedures among Potential Funding Agencies Supporting Education and Health Sector Development Programmes in Ethiopia*. Final report. Helsinki: FTP International.

Oxford Policy Management, 1996. *Sector Investment Programmes in Africa: Issues and Experience*. Final report. Oxford: Oxford Policy Management.

Pavignani, E., 2001. *Swamped in a SWAp? Experience-inspired Remarks about Sector-wide Approaches*. Mimeo.

SADC, 1999. *Food Security and Rural Development Hub: Strategy and Business Plan*. Gaborone: Southern African Development Community.

Schedvin, T. and Skoog, G.E., 2001. *Incentives for Ownership*. Stockholm: Sida/UTV.

Sida, 2000. *Sida's Policy for Sector Programme Support and Provisional Guidelines*. Stockholm: Swedish International Development Agency.

Smith, P., 2000. 'A comment on the limitations of the logical framework method, in reply to Gasper, and to Bell'. *Public Administration and. Development,* 20: 439-441.

Therkildsen, O., 2000. 'Public sector reform in a poor aid-dependent country: Tanzania'. *Public Administration and Development,* 20.

Thioléron, E. S.a. *French Cooperation in the Context of Pooling*. Mimeo.

Thompson, J. B., 2000. *Pooling Resources for Maintenance*. Presentation at the EC-EU Member States Transport Experts Informal Meeting, 28-29 November 2000. S.l.: S.n.

UNDP, 2001. *Compendium of Activities (updated).* Bratislava: United Nations Development Programme (Programme for Accountability and Transparency, PACT/RBEC).

UNFPA, 2000. *UNFPA and Sector-wide Approaches.* Paper for the Executive Board of the UNDP and UNFPA, second regular session, 3-7 April 2000. New York: United Nations Fund for Population Activities.

Van Arkadie, B. and Boi, V.T., 2000. *Review of Technical Cooperation Support to Vietnam: An Independent Report to the Ministry of Planning and Investment* (draft)*.* Mimeo.

Van der Vegt, H., 2001. *Planning and Programming of Interventions.* Presentation at the Good Governance Workshop, Guatemala City, 25-28 March 2001. The Hague: Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Van der Vegt, H., 2001. *The Working Principles of the Sectoral Approach.* Presentation at the Good Governance Workshop, Guatemala City, 25-28 March 2001. The Hague: Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Van de Walle, N. and Johnston, T.A., 1996. *Improving Aid to Africa.* Policy Essay 21. Washington: ODC.

Walt, G. *et al*., 1999. 'Managing external resources in the health sector: lessons for SWAps'. *Health Policy and Planning*, 14(3).

Widner, J.A., 2001. *Building the Rule of Law: Francis Nyalali and the Road to Judicial Independence in Africa.* New York: W.W. Norton.

World Bank, 2001. *Education and Health in Sub-Saharan Africa: A Review of Sector-wide Approaches*. Africa Region Human Development Series. Washington: World Bank.

World Bank, 2001. *Report and Recommendation of the President of the International Development Association to the Executive Directors on a proposed credit of SDR 116.2 million (US$150 million equivalent) to the Republic of Uganda for a poverty reduction support credit.* Report P7442-UG. Washington: World Bank.

World Bank, 2001. *Draft Mozambique Country Financial Accountability Assessment (CFAA).* Washington: World Bank. Mimeo.

ECDPM case studies

These reports can be found in Annexes 2–7 of the full report, and on the ECDPM website.

Land, T., 2001. *Taking Charge of Technical Cooperation: Experience from Botswana: A Case of A Country Firmly in the Driver's Seat.* Maastricht: ECDPM.

Pavignani, E. and Hauck, V., 2001. *The Pooling of Technical Assistance in the Context of Aid Management Reform: The Mozambique Case.* Maastricht: ECDPM.

Thioleron, E. and Dante, I., 2001. *Mise en commun de l'assistance technique dans les programmes sectoriels du Mali.* Maastricht: ECDPM.

Todd, M. and Shimeles, A., 2001. *Pooling of Technical Assistance in the Context of SWAps: Ethiopian Case Study,* Maastricht: ECDPM.

Wangwe, S.M., 2001. *Study on Pooling of Technical Assistance in the Context of Sector-wide Approaches: The Case of Uganda.* Maastricht: ECDPM.

Wangwe, S.M. and Madete, L., 2001. *Pooling of Technical Assistance in the Context of Sector-wide Approaches.* Maastricht: ECDPM.